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Abstract 
The September 11 terrorist attacks in America ‘changed the world’ and many years after, acts of 
terrorism in various forms have endangered and killed innocent people in Cameroon, Nigeria, 
Kenya, Somalia, Belgium, France, Spain, Britain etc., jeopardized fundamental freedoms and se-
riously undermined the dignity of the human population. States have therefore been under an 
obligation to take appropriate measures to protect the fundamental rights and freedom of ever-
yone within their jurisdictions against terrorist acts. In this vein, governments across the globe 
have adopted new laws, and ameliorated and expanded the use of old laws to monitor communi-
cations and counter terrorism. Thus, in 2014 the government of Cameroon passed Law No. 
2014/028 of 23 December on the suppression of acts of terrorism. The main thrust of the law is 
the redefinition of national security to incorporate the risk of terrorist actions undertaken by any 
individual or group. Although the government has argued that the new law is necessary to contain 
the Boko-Haram terrorist group which has carried out kidnappings and attacks in Cameroon, 
this paper argues that there is a dangerous tendency to legitimize human rights violations under 
the guise of combating terrorism. In practice, this leads to a ‘trumping effect’, where the suppres-
sion of acts of terrorism legislations effectively override or take precedence over fundamental 
rights such as freedom of expression, press freedom, the right to peaceful protest and assembly, as 
well as accountability and transparency. Drawing from literature review, documentary research, 
interviews and case law, this paper contends that while the threat of terrorism and the rise of anti-
terrorism legislations to counter terrorism are justified, the existence of arbitrary legislations and 
the vague, broad and sweeping nature of such legislations remain potentially problematic for the 
protection of journalistic sources and other fundamental rights. This complexity is evident in Ca-
meroon where the law on the suppression of acts of terrorism has been invoked to arrest, trial and 
detain journalists, peaceful protesters and Cameroon anglophone activists. The above concerns 
point to the need for reforms of the existing laws on the suppression of acts of terrorism and the 
need for states to reconcile a suitable balance in this new context between protecting the human 
rights of its citizens as potential victims of terrorism and protecting the human rights of alleged 
terrorists. 
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1. Introduction 
Terrorism is not a new issue on the human rights agenda. For many years, various 
forms of terrorism have endangered and killed innocent civilians, jeopardized hu-
man rights and seriously impaired the dignity of the human population. For ins-
tance, in 1998 suicide bombers set off car bombs in vehicles which exploded at 
the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salam, Tanzania. In Nairobi, 213 
people were killed and 4000 seriously injured. In Dar es Salam, 12 people were 
killed and 35 injured. Like Kenya, Nigeria, Chad, Ethiopia, US, France, Belgium, 
Germany, UK, Spain, Turkey, Cameroon has come under the fury and repressive 
hammer of acts of terrorism in all forms from terrorist groups. One of such 
groups is Boko-Haram in the northern part of Nigeria. The group is responsible 
for the kidnapping and killing of innocent schoolchildren in Nigeria. According 
to Amnesty International (AI), between July 2015 and July 2016, Boko Haram 
conducted at least 200 attacks, including 46 suicide bombings, in the Far North 
Regions of Cameroon, killing over 500 civilians and over 67 members of the se-
curity forces since 2014 (AI, 2016). Thus, Cameroon has come under the obli-
gation to take suitable measures to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms 
of everyone living within its jurisdiction against the scourge of terrorism. 
However, after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in America, the above 
scenario changed drastically, ushering in new and huge challenges to the human 
rights agenda. As the German Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs argued in his 
speech before the 58th session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, “the 
11th September and its consequences have reoriented world politics and this is 
not without implications for human rights policy” (Schorlemer, 2003. 226). 
Cameroon has an exemplary military and security pact with the USA, especially 
the partnership in the fight against Boko-Haram. The latter is not only suppor-
ting Cameroon with military equipment but more importantly, the US has sent a 
contingent of 300 troops to assist in intelligence provision to the Cameroonian 
defence and security forces on the war front. Furthermore, the US has opened the 
doors of its military academies to Cameroonian students (Meli, 2017). The call 
by the United States of America for a global partnership and campaign against 
terrorism provided the context for several initiatives by governments including 
Cameroon to tighten security legislations that have been realized at the expense 
of civil and political liberties. There is therefore a real danger that the war against 
terrorism is producing significant shifts in states’ obligation to respect and pro-
tect human rights. However, as Schorlemer (2003: 266) contends “the battle 
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against terrorism itself is also understood as a fight for human rights. Clearly, sta-
tes need to strike a balance in this new context between protecting the human 
rights of its citizens as potential victims of terrorism and protecting the human 
rights of alleged terrorists”. Even more, as advocated by the Venice Commission, 
state security and fundamental rights are not competitive values, but they are 
each other’s precondition. In other words, security is best protected by the en-
hancement and not the suppression or weakening of the rule of law, democratic 
values and human rights (Muma, 2017). Furthermore, the UN Security Resolu-
tion 2178/2014 and the Global Counter Terrorism Strategy underlined that “ef-
fective counter-terrorism measures and the protection of human rights are not 
conflicting goals, but complementary and mutually reinforcing”. This presuppo-
ses that in fulfilling their duties, state authorities (Cameroon) must ensure that 
measures purported to combat terrorism comply with state obligations under in-
ternational human rights law (Muma, 2017). 
This paper examines the ‘trumping effects’ of the Cameroon 2014 anti-terrorism 
legislation. It begins by delineating freedom of expression and peaceful protests 
in a human rights context, then moves on to discuss the constitution as the most 
critical legal construct that has a plethora of prerogatives that directly concerns 
freedom of expression and of the press and peaceful assembly, before going furt-
her to interrogate and analyze the 2014 law on the suppression of acts of terro-
rism. 
 2. Freedom of expression and peaceful protests in the human rights context 
Both international and national law guarantees everyone the right to freedom of 
expression. For instance, article 19(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), one of the United Nations’ two main human rights 
treaties, which has been ratified or acceded to by Cameroon in 1984 provides 
that: 
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include free-
dom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of 
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other 
media of his choice. 
The above wording corresponds to article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights (UDHR). Similar provisions also appear in the three main regional 
human rights treaties, the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (Arti-
cle 9) which Cameroon ratified in 1989, the European Convention on Human 
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Rights (ECHR, Article 10(1), and the American Convention on Human Rights 
(Article 13). 
Depending on the situation, peaceful protests (a core theme of this paper) may 
also be covered by the right to freedom of peaceful assembly, a closely related 
right often used interchangeably with the right to freedom of expression, and is 
codified in article 20 of the UDHR, article 21 of the ICCPR and article 11 of the 
ECHR. However, the right to freedom of expression and assembly are not abso-
lute and may be restricted by the national authorities in order to protect other 
relevant interests, for instance public order. Article 19(3) of the ICCPR requires, 
however, that any interference meet the following three conditions: 
- The interference must be prescribed by law 
- Must serve a legitimate aim, such as the protection of public order or the 
rights of others; and 
- Must be necessary and proportionate for the achievement of that aim. 
The Constitution 
The existence of a constitution is an important in-road to the development of 
freedom of expression and of the press. It is therefore no coincidence that the 
constitutions of a growing number of nations have provided specific guarantees 
for the rights to freedom of expression, freedom of the press and of assembly. This 
is the case with many states which have embraced democratic and multiparty po-
litical systems and others who are currently in transition to democracy. A good 
example is Sweden, where its entire freedom of the press act, adopted in 1766, 
has constitutional status. This act makes relevant provisions on the right to infor-
mation (Berger, 2007; Voorhoof, 1998). This wide-scale consensus through for-
mal constitutional guarantees is also true as in the case of the First Amendment 
of the US Constitution of 1781. In like manner, more recent constitutions like 
those of Mali, Senegal, Zambia, Nigeria, Gabon and Cameroon have provided 
similar guarantees for freedom of expression.  
The core of the constitutional protection of the above rights per se is the pream-
ble of the Cameroon constitution. It affirms the attachment of the country to the 
fundamental freedoms enshrined in the UDHR, the Charter of the United Na-
tions, and the ACHPR, and all duly ratified international conventions relating 
thereto. This paper argues that fundamental democratic rights are inscribed in 
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the preamble of the Cameroon constitution, i.e. the freedom of communication, 
of expression, of the press and of assembly, as well as the right to strike. 
The question now is: with the threat of terrorism and the advent of the anti-terro-
rism legislation in Cameroon, are press freedom, freedom of expression and the 
public right to peaceful protests as guaranteed by the constitution respected? In 
trying to provide answers to the above question, the section below interrogates 
and appraised the law on the suppression of acts of terrorism, showing how the 
law has been evoked to arrest, trial and detain journalists, peaceful protesters and 
Cameroon anglophone activists. 
Law No. 2014/028 of 23 December 2014 on the suppression of acts of te-
rrorism 
The law is divided into four chapters incorporating 17 sections. Chapter 1 is en-
titled general provisions and deals with the purpose and scope of the law while 
chapter 2 focusses on offences and penalties. It contains 9 sections addressing, 
inter-alia, acts of terrorism, financing of acts of terrorism, laundering of proceeds 
of terrorism, recruitment and training, criminal liability of corporate bodies, inte-
rruption of the offence or its effects, acclamation of acts of terrorism, false state-
ment or defamatory reports and witness protection. Chapter 3 is entitled special 
provisions and is composed of 6 sections, that is remand in custody, referral be-
fore the competent court, mitigating circumstances, ancillary penalties, indefeasi-
bility of court actions and penalties and waivers. The last chapter, composed of 
one section, is informed by the final provision of the law. 
According to chapter 2, section 2 of the above law: 
Whoever, acting alone as an accomplice or accessory, commits or threatens to 
commit an act likely to cause death, endanger physical integrity, cause bodily injury 
or material damage, destroy natural resources, the environment and cultural herit-
age with intent to: (a) intimidate the public, provoke a situation of terror or face the 
victim, the government and/or national and international organization to carry out 
or restrain from carrying out an act or renounce a particular position; (b) disrupt 
the national functioning of public services, the delivery of essential services to the 
public to create a crisis situation among the public; (c) create widespread insurrec-
tion in the country; (d) shall be punished with a death penalty. 
The law moves on in chapter 2, sections 3, 4 and 5 to provide a death penalty to 
all those who are guilty of ‘financing acts of terrorism’, ‘laundering of the proceeds 
of terrorism’ and ‘recruitment and training of people’ to participate in acts of te-
rrorism. According to chapter 2, section 3 (1): 
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Whoever directly or indirectly provides or collects funds; provides or offers or col-
lects funds with the aim of financing acts of terrorism and by whatever means, shall 
be punished with a death penalty. 
Section 4 of the above chapter entitled laundering of proceeds of terrorism stipu-
lates that: 
whoever procures, receives, keeps, converts, dissimulates or disguises goods that 
are proceeds or acts of terrorism; partakes in the use or sharing even occasionally, 
of proceeds of acts of terrorism, shall be punished with a death penalty.  
The penalty provided in (1) above shall apply to whoever: (a) offers or promises 
gifts, presents or any kind of benefit to another with the intention of getting the later 
to be part of a group that has been established or a deal reached to commit acts of 
terrorism; (b) threatens or pressurizes another to be part of a group that has been 
established or a deal reached to commit acts of terrorism;  
whoever deliberately joins or undergoes training in a terrorist group abroad with 
intent to commit acts of terrorism within the country, shall be punished with im-
prisonment of from 10 to 20 years. 
Section 5 (recruitment and training) stipulates that “whoever recruits and/or 
trains people to participate in the act of terrorism, regardless of where they are 
committed, shall be punished with the death penalty”. 
Chapter 2, section 8 (acclamation of acts of terrorism) of the law provides severe 
charges for all those who acclaims acts of terrorism. Section 8 states that: 
Whoever publicly acclaims acts of terrorism shall be punished with imprisonment 
of, from 15-20 years or a fine of, from twenty-five million francs (25.000.000) 
FCFA to fifty million (50.000.000) FCFA or both such imprisonment and fine. 
3. Analysis of the law 
The relevance of an effective legal framework for the fight against terrorism can-
not be over- emphasized. However, formulating such a legal protection is not 
without its own difficulties. This section provides a critical analysis of the 2014 
Cameroon anti-terrorism law. In doing so, it focuses on the provisions of the law, 
its ramifications on press freedom and freedom of expression, as well as the right 
to peaceful assembly (legitimate peaceful protests).  
Drawing from the provisions of the law, this paper argues that like article 1 of the 
UK anti-terrorism law, article 2 of the Cameroon anti-terrorism law is very broad 
on the definition of terrorism. The law criminalizes not only acts that are widely 
understood as ‘terrorist’ in nature but also lawful gatherings and protests and ot-
her forms of behaviour that cannot be regarded as terrorism. Looking at the 
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scope of the law, article 2 of the Cameroon anti-terrorism law, anyone who dis-
rupts the functioning of public services, the delivery of essential services to the 
population, or creates a situation of crisis among the public, can be sanctioned 
with the death penalty. 
In the case of Sergey Kuznetzov v. Russia, the European court of human rights 
(ECtHR) underscored that: 
Any demonstration in a public place inevitably causes a certain level of disruption 
to ordinary life; including disruption to traffic, and that it is important for the public 
authorities to show a certain degree of tolerance towards peaceful gatherings if the 
freedom of assembly guaranteed by article 11 of the convention is not to be de-
prived of all substance. The court stressed that “any measures interfering with free-
dom of assembly and expression other than in cases of incitement to violence or 
rejection of democratic principles-however shocking, and unacceptable certain 
views or words used may appear to the authorities-do a disservice to democracy 
and often even endanger it”. In this case, the court found a violation of article 11 of 
the convention interpreted in the light of article 10 of the convention. 
Furthermore, I contend that there are so many protests and demonstrations that 
have taken place both in Cameroon and elsewhere in the world that disrupted 
the functioning of public services and the delivery of essential services to the po-
pulation that cannot be regarded as terrorism. For instance, the 2008 Cameroon 
protests which were a series of demonstrations in Cameroon's biggest cities that 
took place from 25 to 29 February 2008. The protests followed on the heels of a 
strike by transport workers, who were opposing high fuel prices and poor wor-
king conditions. Further political turmoil had been caused by President Paul Bi-
ya's announcement that he wanted the constitution to be amended to remove 
term limits; without such an amendment, he would have to leave office at the end 
of his term in 2011. Similarly, one may not ignore the Arab Spring, the wave of 
pro-democracy protests and uprisings that took place in the Middle East and 
North Africa beginning in 2010 and 2011, challenging some of the region’s en-
trenched authoritarian regimes. Also, the orange revolution, a series of protests 
and political events that took place in Ukraine from late November 2004 to 
January 2005, in the immediate aftermath of the run-off vote of the 2004 Ukrai-
nian presidential election, which was claimed to be marred by massive corrup-
tion, voter intimidation and direct electoral fraud. The above activities disrupted 
the functioning of public services, the delivery of essential services to the popula-
tion, and created a situation of crisis among the public but could these activities 
be regarded as acts of terrorism and its proponents sanctioned with the death pe-
nalty? 
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The law is unconstitutional. This is because it includes the death penalty as a 
sanction to terrorism. In doing so, the law violates the right to life and human dig-
nity which are guaranteed in the preamble to the constitution. Chapter 1, section 
1 of the law stipulates that: 
This law relates to the suppression of acts of terrorism. The provisions of the penal 
code, the criminal code and the military justice code that are not repugnant to this 
law shall remain applicable. The offences provided for in this law shall fall exclu-
sively under the jurisdiction of military tribunals. 
This paper argues that International law prohibits the use of military courts to try 
civilians. As we are going to see below, many Cameroonians in general and Ca-
meroon anglophone activists in particular have been tried in military tribunals 
across the country. For instance, Mancho Bixby, a Cameroonian anglophone ac-
tivist and radio journalist was tried, convicted, and sentenced before a military 
court. There is widespread international consensus that trials of civilians by mili-
tary tribunals contravene the non-derogable rights to a fair trial by a competent, 
independent and impartial court to the extent that they violate rights guaranteed 
by instruments such as the UDHR, ICCPR and the Banjul Charter. The case law 
of the ACHPR is very clear on the fact that military tribunals lack authority to try 
civilians. In the Kevin Mgwanga Gunme et al vs. Cameroon case, the African 
Commission stated that: 
Trial by military courts does not per se constitute a violation of the right to be tried 
by a competent organ. What poses a problem is the fact that, very often, the military 
tribunals are an extension of the executive, rather than the judiciary. Military tribu-
nals are not intended to try civilians. They are established to try military personnel 
under laws and regulations which govern the military. 
In Communication 218/98 Civil Liberties Organisation, Legal Defence Centre, 
Legal Defence and Assistance Project v. Nigeria, the Commission underlined 
that “the military tribunals are not negated by the mere fact of being presided over 
by military officers. The critical factor is whether the process is fair, just and im-
partial”. 
In the case of Media Rights Agenda v. Nigeria, the ACHPR found that special tri-
bunals set up by the military regime with an ouster of the jurisdiction of the ordi-
nary courts “violates the right to have one’s cause heard, under article 7.1. The 
ACHPR confirmed the prohibition in the Resolution on the Right to a Fair Trial 
and Legal Aid in Africa that states in Principle L:  
- The only purpose of Military Courts shall be to determine offences of a 
purely military nature committed by military personnel 
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- While exercising this function, Military Courts are required to respect fair 
trial standards enunciated in the African Charter and in these guidelines 
- Military courts should not in any circumstances whatsoever have juris-
diction over civilians. Similarly, Special Tribunals should not try offences 
that fall within the jurisdiction of regular courts.  
The UN Human Rights Committee (HR Committee) through Concluding Ob-
servations on States’ reports, General Comments interpreting the ICCPR and 
Views regarding complaints, agrees that “the jurisdiction of military tribunals is 
restricted to offences of a strictly military nature committed by military person-
nel”. In 1984, the HR Committee affirmed in its General Comment 13 that mili-
tary tribunals are prohibited from trying civilians except in extraordinary, objec-
tively determined and narrowly defined circumstances such as cases where fair, 
independent and impartial civilian courts are unavailable.  
The law has gone beyond prohibiting acts of terrorism or their instigation to 
prohibit the acclamation, encouragement, glorification and even encouragement 
of terrorism. Chapter 2, section 8 (acclamation of acts of terrorism) of the law 
provides severe charges for all those who acclaim acts of terrorism. This paper is 
concerned that the above provisions violate the right to freedom of expression 
and assembly. This paper argues that freedom of expression protects not only 
views that are favorably received but precisely all those that are controversial, sho-
cking or offensive. In the 1992 Open Door and Dublin Well Women vs. Ireland 
case, the European court of human rights reasserted that: 
Freedom of expression was particularly precious as a way of communicating infor-
mation or ideas that offend, shock or disturb the state or any sector of the popula-
tion; as such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness 
without which there is no democratic society. 
Thus, the terminology employed by the anti-terrorism law is so vague and fail to 
meet the requirement that restrictions on freedom of expression should be pres-
cribed by law. What amounts to ‘acclaims acts of terrorism’? The use of the ex-
pression is of particular concern as its interpretation is likely to be highly subjec-
tive. According to Article 19 (2006:8), glorification, justification, or any other 
form of expression concerning terrorism, or any form of violence can be prohibi-
ted unless it is clearly intended to directly incite such conduct. It is significant to 
the guarantee of freedom of expression and the right to peaceful assembly that 
any interference for the purpose of national security, including countering terro-
rism, is closely linked to preventing or mitigating imminent violence. 
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According to article 18(3) of the ICCPR which Cameroon ratified in 1984, any 
restriction or interference on the right to freedom of expression must be “prescri-
bed by law” and “must be necessary in a democratic society”. Drawing from the 
case law of the ECtHR, necessary in a democratic society amounts to a “pressing 
social need”. This presupposes that measures taken for the restriction or interfe-
rence of fundamental freedoms must be effective and the scope and effects of the 
limitation must be proportionate in relation to the importance of the resulting 
interest to be protected (Muma, 2017). The expression provided by law, 
however, presupposes that a limitation on freedom of expression must be laid 
down in law with sufficient precision, must be transparent and accessible to the 
public. The word law in this context has an autonomous meaning. It is the force 
of politically organized society and incorporates for instance written and unwrit-
ten laws (Gardner, 2001), such as the constitution, anti-terrorism law, criminal 
law etc.  
According to article 18(3) of the ICCPR, the expression “prescribed by law” also 
implies that any interference with freedom of expression must adequately specify 
the permissibility of a given restriction by the authorities. In other words, for a 
norm (anti-terrorism law) to be characterized as law, it must be well formulated 
and explicit so as to guide the society on how and when to exercise their funda-
mental rights and freedoms, and must be compatible with international human 
rights standards. The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
(ODIHR) of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) guidelines also point to the fact that for a norm to be characterized as 
law, it must be compatible with international human rights standards and be suf-
ficiently precise to enable an individual to assess whether or not his/her actions 
or conduct would be in breach of the law and the likely consequences of such 
transgressions (ODIHR/OSCE, 2010).  
According to Muma (2017), the UN human rights committee as an interpreta-
tive guideline has observed that for a norm to become law, it must be formulated 
with sufficient precision to enable an individual to regulate his/her conduct ac-
cordingly, and must be made accessible to the public. Laws should provide suffi-
cient guidance to all those charged with its execution to enable them to ascertain 
what sorts of expressions or freedoms are to be restricted and what sorts are not. 
Furthermore, the human rights committee has argued that offences as “encoura-
gement of terrorism”, and “extreme activity” as well as offences of “acclaiming, 
praising, glorifying or justifying terrorism” should be carefully defined to ensure 
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that they donot lead to unnecessary and disproportionate interferences with hu-
man rights and freedoms (Muma, 2017; General Comment, No. 34).  
By the same token, the African Commission guidelines regarding countering te-
rrorism in Africa has stressed that any criminalization of or other punishments 
for acts of terrorism must abide by the principle of legality and, as such, states 
should ensure that their laws criminalizing acts of terrorism are accessible to the 
public, defined by clear and precise provisions in the law, non-discriminatory and 
non-retroactive, and must be directed only against acts done knowingly and with 
intent and in accordance with international law. In the Sunday Times vs. UK case, 
the ECtHR clearly stated that: 
A norm cannot be regarded as a law unless it is formulated with sufficient precision 
to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be able if need be with appro-
priate advice to foresee to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the con-
sequences which a given action may entail. 
The court has reasoned that laws which are not formulated with sufficient preci-
sion are considered vague. This is the case because vague and broad provisions 
(as is the case with the Cameroon 2014 anti-terrorism law) are susceptible to 
wide interpretation by both the authorities and those subjected to the law. As we 
are going to unpack sooner below, in Cameroon in particular, such laws has been 
susceptible to abusive interpretation by the authorities, most especially the judi-
ciary which enjoys limited autonomy. According to Ben Emmerson, special rap-
porteur on the promotion of human rights and freedoms while countering terro-
rism, “vagueness of concept could lead to its use against members of religious mi-
norities, civil society, human rights defenders, peaceful separatists, indigenous 
groups and members of opposition political parties” (Muma, 2017). In other 
words, the provisions of a given law must be formulated with sufficient legal pre-
cision so that the possibility of commission of an offence is foreseeable. Drawing 
from the above analysis, this paper argues that the Cameroon anti-terrorism law 
is unconstitutional, vague, very broad and imprecise. According to AI (2015) re-
port on Cameroon, the law infringes on so many basic rights and freedoms pro-
tected in the constitution and international human rights law. The Cameroon 
National Commission on human rights and freedoms (NCHRF) is concerned 
that the degrading security situation in the country could provide justification for 
the application of the law, or encourage the authorities to use their sweeping po-
wers to suppress press freedom, freedom of expression and the right to peaceful 
assembly (NCHRF, 2015). 
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The ‘Johannesburg Principles’, a set of principles on freedom of expression and 
national security developed by a group of experts from around the world, argues 
that restrictions on freedom of expression in the name of national security may 
be imposed only where the speech was intended to incite imminent violence and 
there is a direct and immediate connection between the expression and the like-
lihood or occurrence of such violence. Principle 6 stipulates that: 
Expression must be punished as a threat to national security only if the govern-
ment can demonstrate that: 
- The expression is intended to incite imminent violence 
- It is likely to incite such violence and 
- There is a direct and immediate connection between the expression and 
the likelihood of occurrence of such violence (Article 19, 2006). 
The ECtHR decision in the case of Karatas vs. Turkey is particularly instructive. 
The complainant had been convicted for the publication of poetry that allegedly 
condoned and glorified acts of terrorism (note the similarity between this case to 
the new offences under the Cameroon 2014 anti-terrorism law). The court no-
ted as a matter of fact that in Turkey violent terrorist attacks was a daily reality. 
But even in a context of regular threats to national security, the court underlined 
the fundamental nature of the applicant’s right to freedom of expression and held 
that his conviction constituted a violation of that right. Highlighting that there 
was no congruity or causal connection between the poems and violence, the 
court held: 
In the instant case, the poems had an obvious political dimension. Using colorful 
imagery, they expressed deep-rooted discontent with the lot of the population of 
Kurdish origin in Turkey. In that connection, the court recalls that there is little 
scope under article 10(2) of the convention for restrictions on political speech or 
on debate on matters of public interest….In a democratic society, the actions and 
omissions of the government must be subject to the close scrutiny not only of the 
legislative and judiciary authorities but also of public opinion. Moreover, the dom-
inant position which government occupies makes it necessary for it to display re-
straint in resorting to criminal proceedings, particularly where other means are 
available for replying to the unjustified attacks and criticisms of the adver-
saries….Even though some of the passages from the poems seem very aggressive 
in tone and to call for the use of violence, the court considers that the fact that they 
were artistic in nature and of limited impact made them less a call to an uprising 
than an expression of deep distress in the face of a difficult political situation. 
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Drawing from the strength of the court’s judgment in Karatas vs. Turkey, a gene-
ral prohibition of glorification of violence cannot be justified. Only those state-
ments of glorification and acclamation of acts of terrorism that can be said to ac-
tually incite violence may be legitimately prohibited. The ensuing paragraphs 
provides more impetus and illuminates clearly the above arguments. 
The 2014 anti-terrorism legislation and press freedom and freedom of ex-
pression  
Cameroon is a member of the UN, party to the UDHR, the ICCPR and its Opti-
onal Protocol and a member of the ACHPR. Cameroon ratified the ICCPR on 
January 27, 1984 and it came into force on the 27 of April that same year. Article 
2(2) of the ICCPR states that: 
Where not provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each state party 
to the present covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with 
its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present covenant, to 
adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the 
rights recognized in the present covenant. 
This means that Cameroon has a positive obligation not only to refrain from in-
terfering with freedom of expression but also to protect journalists and media or-
ganizations from unlawful interference. Thus, the obligation to respect freedom 
of opinion and expression is binding on Cameroon. However, the 2014 law on 
the suppression of acts of terrorism in Cameroon has been invoked to arrest, trial 
and detain journalists, peaceful protesters and Cameroon anglophone activists as 
we are going to unpack below. On July 30th, 2015 Ahmed Abba, a Radio France 
International (RFI) correspondent was arrested and after 2 years in custody con-
victed by a military tribunal for “non-denunciation of terrorism” and “laundering 
of the proceeds of terrorist attacks”. The journalist was sentenced to 10 years in 
prison. However, he was finally released in December 2017 after a military appeal 
court in Yaoundé reduced his jail term to 24 months (CPJ, 2017). 
Radio journalist, Mancho Bibixy, who was arrested in 2017 on terrorism charges 
after he advocated for Anglophone rights and criticized government policies, was 
sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment in May 2018. On 23rd October 2018, edi-
tor of the privately owned Hurinews.com website and human rights advocate, 
Michel Biem Tong was arrested. He was accused of 'glorification of terrorist acts'. 
Biem Tong had been reporting on human rights violations committed by the 
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authorities in the anglophone regions, criticizing government handling of the cri-
sis that started in 2016. CPJ (2018) contends that since 2016 Cameroon has re-
peatedly jailed journalists for reporting in the western regions of the country. 
On 31st October 2018, Mimi Mefo, head of the English language news of the pri-
vately owned Equinoxe television and Equinoxe radio, was arrested and later pla-
ced in preventive detention on 7th November 2018 but released 4 days later fo-
llowing unprecedented national and international mobilization. The authorities 
argued that Mimi disseminated fake news likely to harm public authorities and 
that the said crime is punishable under section 113 of the criminal code. Mimi 
Mefo maintained that: 
The regime has been using anti-terror and cybercrime laws to intimidate, threaten 
and silence the media. Since 2017, at least 20 journalists have been arrested and 
jailed in Cameroon for doing their jobs”. According to the journalist, “I stopped 
publishing information on Facebook and my website for several months because 
of constant threats and intimidation. The crisis in Cameroon remains highly un-
der-reported. Journalists are not guaranteed safety when travelling to conduct in-
vestigations, and access to information is a major problem. A government who im-
prisons a journalist is weak, scared of being exposed (Mefo, 2019). 
According to the CPJ (2017): 
The authorities are using the law against journalists such as Abba who report on 
the militants and others who have reported on unrest in Cameroon’s English-
speaking regions or are critical of Biya’s administration. In addition to detaining 
journalists, authorities have banned news outlets deemed sympathetic to the an-
glophone protests, shut out internet in regions experiencing unrest and prevented 
outside observers, including CPJ, from accessing the country by delaying the visa 
process. 
Thus, under the 2014 anti-terrorism legislation, Cameroonian journalists are re-
gularly unfairly judged, convicted, jailed or threatened. This has wider conse-
quences for Cameroon and the sub region. First, such threats have driven Came-
roon to become the second jailer of journalists in Africa with 7 journalists behind 
bars for their work as of December 1, 2018, according to CPJ's annual prison cen-
sus. According to CPJ, Cameroon comes only behind Eritrea, ranked first (CPJ, 
2019). The current situation has impacted on the country’s press freedom ran-
king. Cameroon is currently ranked 131 out of 180 countries in Reporters sans 
Frontières’ world press freedom index of 2019. The situation was not any better 
in 2018 when Cameroon was ranked 129th out of 180 countries. 
Also, for those journalists who want to escape trouble, ‘self-censorship’ often be-
comes a habit. Self-censorship is convenient for semi-authoritarian states, as 
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constraints are appropriated and established inside the minds of journalists: en-
couraging self-censorship around sensitive issues is the ideal way to operate the 
most discreet form of prior control (Frère, 2015). As Ottaway (2004, 163) ar-
gues, in such a context, ‘a degree of self-censorship allows independent newspa-
pers to exist, but also limits their risk. Therefore, in these contexts public authori-
ties can claim to be supporting press freedom and freedom of expression, but 
they may use other underhand means to undermine the media’s potential to trig-
ger change within society. This kind of ‘double speak’ might see government pas-
sing a law protecting press freedom, freedom of expression, the protection of 
journalistic sources and the right to peaceful assembly, while at the same time 
threatening journalists to reveal confidential sources or arresting people for exer-
cising their rights to peaceful assembly and charging them with terrorism. 
While the anti-terrorism law and the criminal code have been invoked to trial 
many journalists working for private media outlets who are guilty of fake news or 
spreading false information, it is disturbing to realize that this trend has not been 
applicable to the state-owned media. A state-owned television (CRTV) report in 
the aftermath of the 2018 presidential election included supposed Transparency 
International(TI)observers praising the electoral process. TI issued a statement 
after the report was aired, asserting that they had no election observers in Came-
roon. While CRTV fake news concerning election observers from TI approving 
the conduct of the presidential poll infringes on all aspects of journalistic canons 
and section 113 of the criminal code, neither the institution nor the journalist res-
ponsible took responsibility. Even more, at year’s end, the debunked story remai-
ned on CRTV’s website. 
Furthermore, in July 2018, a video circulated online that showed the extrajudicial 
executions of two women and two children by Cameroonian soldiers who accu-
sed them of involvement with Boko Haram. The minister of communication and 
government spokesman vehemently denied on television that the accused sol-
diers were Cameroonian and termed the video report as fake news intended to 
tarnish the image of the Cameroon military and the country. However, in Sep-
tember, after initially denying that the military was responsible for the crimes, the 
government announced that seven soldiers had been arrested and would be tried 
for murder (O’ Gray, 2018) 
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The 2014 anti-terrorism legislation and the right to peaceful assembly 
This section demonstrates how the anti-terrorism legislation of 2014 has been 
invoked to arrest, trial and detain Cameroonians exercising their rights to 
peaceful assembly. This paper argues that peaceful direct action has historically 
challenged practices that were legal at the time, but which we now find abhorrent, 
such as slavery, racial segregation and color or gender-based voting rights. It is for 
this reason that all states would do well to honor and respect their human rights 
obligations regarding freedom of expression and the right to peaceful assembly. 
Since October 2016, the English-speaking part of Cameroon has experienced se-
rious repression and continuous human rights violations following peaceful pro-
tests and an ensuing series of sit-in strikes and non-violent actions initiated by 
common law lawyers and teachers’ trade unions in protest against government 
policy of assimilation through the imposition of civil law judges to preside over 
cases in common law courts and French-speaking teachers to teach in English 
schools. Civil society organizations coordinating the strikes and protest actions 
were banned on 17 January 2017. Leaders, including Justice Ayah Paul Abine 
(Supreme Court Judge), Felix Agbor Balla (prominent international human 
rights lawyer), Dr Neba Fontem (a university lecturer), Mr. Mancho Bibixy (a 
civil rights activist), and hundreds of other activists and protesters were arrested 
and transferred to the nation’s capital, Yaoundé (a civil law jurisdiction). They 
are being tried in a military court on charges of terrorism, which carries the death 
penalty if found guilty. 
However, on 30th August 2017, president Paul Biya signed a decree ordering the 
release and dropping of all charges against arrested leaders of the Anglophone 
South West and North West regions. The leaders released included Lawyer Felix 
Nkongho, Dr Neba Fontem, and Ayah Paul Abine among others. According to 
Amnesty International (2017): 
Today’s decision to drop all charges and release of Anglophone civil society leaders, 
including Barrister Nkongho Felix Agbor-Balla and Dr Fontem Aforteka’a Neba, 
and several others who spent over six months in jail is an enormous relief and wel-
come news for everyone who has been campaigning for this outcome. They should 
never have been arrested and prosecuted in the first place for simply helping to or-
ganize peaceful, non-violent protests. 
Since the above interferences, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly 
have been subjected to significant restrictions. Authorities continued to repress 
protests in the Anglophone regions in 2018. In March, more than 100 women in 
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the Cameroon People’s Party (CPP) were arrested and detained for several days 
for staging a demonstration to protest the humanitarian crisis in the Anglophone 
regions. Assembly rights were also curtailed after the election. In November, 
authorities arrested 20 protesters in Yaoundé who claimed that Maurice Kamto 
had won the election. On 28th Jan 2019, opposition party leader Maurice Kamto, 
president of Movement for the Renaissance of Cameroon (MRC), who came se-
cond in the October 2018 presidential election, was arrested in Douala along 
with two of his supporters, Albert Dzongang and Christian Penda Ekoka. More 
than 200 militants of the party, including the party’s former campaign manager, 
Paul Eric Kingue and popular musician Gaston Serval Abe, were arrested in mar-
ches in several cities including Yaoundé, Douala, Bafang, Dschang and Bafous-
sam. The MRC had called for peaceful public protests or “marches blanches” 
across the country to protest alleged mass irregularities in the electoral process, 
electoral fraud, outright denunciation of the proclamation of the October 22, 
2018 presidential results and generalized injustices in Cameroon. Also, Michele 
Ndoki, vice president of the women’s directorate of the MRC was arrested on 
26th Febraury, 2019 in Idenau, South West region. The firebrand lawyer is behind 
bars facing charges of rebellion, insurrection and hostility against the fatherland, 
same as MRC leader, Maurice Kamto and over 150 militants, of the same party. 
For human rights advocate, Agbor Balla, speaking to RFI journalist, Okello 
(2019) the charges are all too familiar: 
The charges are bogus. These are the charges that the government brought against 
me. It’s a way to fight against dissent, repress people, and to perpetuate Mr. Biya’s 
reign as they have been doing for the last 36 years. 
Drawing from the above, this paper argues that Cameroon has consistently mo-
ved to restrict activists, lawyers and teachers’ organizations in their ability to cri-
ticize and peacefully protest its policy of assimilation. Peaceful protests by Came-
roonians have been depicted as acts of violence, revolution, secession, collective 
rebellion, hostility against the state and terrorism, and these qualifications have 
been used to call for far-reaching restrictions. The use of peaceful protests to furt-
her change in society is obviously not the exclusive domain of lawyers and 
teachers and militants of the political parties in Cameroon. In fact, it is embedded 
in history as a driver for positive change. Where demonstrations do not engage 
in acts of violence, it is important for the public authorities to exercise tolerance 
towards peaceful gatherings if the freedom of expression and of assembly guaran-
teed by the constitution of Cameroon is not to be deprived of all its substance. 
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It is the responsibility of each government to respect the right to freedom of ex-
pression and assembly and to justify any restriction to them. Government state-
ments which wrongfully equate the exercise of this right by activists, political par-
ties’ militants, lawyers and teachers with hostility against the state, revolution, co-
llective rebellion, propagation of false news, terrorism and secession should be 
condemned. Such false allegations can have a dangerous chilling effect. It has the 
tendency to undermine the activities of the person or organization involved, 
endangering the further exercise of freedom of expression. Even more, by labe-
lling its critics terrorists, the government may discourage other citizens from voi-
cing their opposition to official policy of assimilation. 
4. Importance and scope 
In 2001, the ACHPR meeting at its 29th Ordinary Session in Tripoli passed a 
resolution on freedom of expression. Recalling article 9 of the ACHPR which 
guarantees the right to freedom of expression and recognizing that freedom of 
expression is an essential attribute of human existence in all spheres of life and 
that there is now widespread international recognition of the cardinal role of 
freedom of expression in human progress; noting that freedom of expression is a 
potent and indispensable instrument for the creation and maintenance of a de-
mocratic society and the consolidation of development; mindful of the poten-
tially narrow scope of protection given by article 9 of the ACHPR, the ACHPR 
has decided to: 
- To develop and adopt, through a consultative process, a Declaration of 
Principles on Freedom of Expression, drawn from a comprehensive 
range on international standards and jurisprudence, to elaborate and ex-
pound the nature, content and extent of the right to freedom of expres-
sion provided for under Article 9 of the African Charter, 
- To initiate an appropriate mechanism to assist it review and monitor ad-
herence to freedom of expression standards in general, the Declaration 
to investigate violations and make appropriate recommendations to the 
Commission, 
- To hold periodic meetings with NGOs and African journalists to review 
progress in guaranteeing freedom of expression across the continent and 
in implementing the Declaration of Principles. 
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It is also important to underline that the right to freedom of expression is not li-
mited to spoken or written communication but applies equally to acts and beha-
vior which convey an opinion, including peaceful protests, demonstrations (as 
those exercised by Cameroon anglophone activists, lawyers and teachers as well 
as MRC party militants) and campaigners. The United Nations Human Rights 
Committee (HRC), which oversees the implementation of the ICCPR, has reite-
rated that ‘article 19, paragraph 2, must be interpreted as encompassing every 
form of subjective ideas and opinions capable of transmission to others. 
In Maseko v. The Prime Minister of Swaziland case (2016), the High Court of 
Swaziland held that certain sections of the Sedition and Subversive Activities Act 
No. 46 of 1938 and the Suppression of Terrorism Act 3 of 2008 infringed the 
fundamental rights to freedom of expression and association guaranteed by the 
Constitution. Further, the court found it unlawful to limit free speech for the sole 
purpose of shielding the government from criticism or discontent. The appli-
cants had been arrested on charges of sedition, subversion and terrorism for their 
membership in an opposition movement, wearing its t-shirts and chanting slo-
gans associated with the movement. 
The court reiterated that freedom of expression ‘is not absolute and as such, there 
are limits within which it may be exercised’. Considering its own jurisprudence 
and a number of foreign cases on the validity of restrictions on free speech, the 
court addressed whether the limitations imposed by the Act were “proportional 
to the mischief sought to be regulated or whether there is a rational connection 
between such limitations and objectives to which restrictions or limitations re-
late. The court held that the objectives or interests “may only be of ‘defence, pu-
blic safety, public order, public morality or public health’ or the other interests 
enumerated under section 24(3) or 25(3) of the constitution. On the other 
hand, the court found it unlawful to limit free speech for the sole purpose of shiel-
ding the government from criticism or discontent. 
As to the impugned provisions of the Suppression of Terrorism Act of 2008, the 
Court first determined that the arrest of the applicants for belonging to the Peo-
ple’s United Democratic Movement, chanting its slogans and wearing t-shirts as-
sociated with the movement interfered with their rights to freedom of expression 
and association. The court went on to state that the government did not provide 
enough justification as to why such limitations could be appropriate under the 
Terrorism Act, nor did they address whether the enforcement of the impugned 
provisions was proportional to the applicants’ conduct. 
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Also, as recalled by the European Court of Human Rights in the 1998 Steel and 
Others vs. United Kingdom case, ‘freedom of expression constitutes an essential 
foundation of democratic societies and one of the basic conditions for its pro-
gress and for each individual’s self-fulfillment’. In the 2009 Women on the waves 
vs. Portugal case, the court emphasized the crucial significance of freedom of ex-
pression. It argued that freedom of expression constitutes one of the preliminary 
conditions for the good functioning of a democracy. In the 1992 Open Door and 
Dublin Well Women vs. Ireland case, the court reasserted that “freedom of ex-
pression was particularly precious as a way of communicating information or 
ideas that offend, shock or disturb the state or any sector of the population; as 
such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without 
which there is no democratic society”. 
5. Duties of the state in relation to peaceful protests and peaceful protesters 
With the right to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly clarified, the ques-
tion arises what the duties of the state (Cameroon) are in respect of these rights. 
Cameroon ratified the ICCPR on January 27, 1984 and it came into force on the 
27 of April that same year. Article 2(2) of the ICCPR states that:  
Where not provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each state party 
to the present covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with 
its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present covenant, to 
adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the 
rights recognized in the present covenant. 
This means that Cameroon has a positive obligation, not only to refrain from in-
terfering with freedom of expression and peaceful assembly but also to protect 
protesters from abuse and mistreatment. State parties are required to ensure that 
the rights contained in article 19 of the covenant are given effect in domestic law. 
State party should include information on available remedies when these rights 
are being violated. 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (The Commission) 
has also passed a resolution on the right to peaceful demonstrations. The Com-
mission meeting at its 55th Ordinary Session held from 28 April to 12 May 2014, 
in Luanda, Angola called on all states’ parties to: 
- Refrain from conducting arbitrary arrests and detentions of demonstra-
tors and calls for their immediate release; 
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- Refrain from disproportionate use of force against demonstrators whilst 
fully complying with international standards on the use of force and fi-
rearms by law enforcement officials; 
- Conduct impartial and independent investigations into all human rights 
violations to ensure that all perpetrators are held accountable; 
- Protect peaceful protesters regardless of their political affiliation, and/or 
sex; 
- Fully abide by their regional and international obligations to respect fun-
damental rights and freedoms; 
- Uphold the right to a fair trial before an independent ordinary court of 
law and put an end to arbitrary arrests and detentions and to the use of 
special courts, including military tribunals for civilians; 
- Ensure that any legislation governing the exercise of fundamental human 
rights fully complies with the relevant regional and international stan-
dards. 
In the case Njaru v. Cameroon, Communication No. 1353/2005, 3 April 2007, 
the UN Human Rights Committee found Cameroon in breach of its obligations 
under the ICCPR, notably the prohibition against torture and ill-treatment and 
the right to freedom of expression. In Kevin Ngwanga et al v. Cameroon, the Afri-
can human rights commission found a violation of article 4 of the charter. The 
communication gives account of people who were killed by the police during vio-
lent suppressions of peaceful demonstrations. The respondent state admitted to 
the death of six people on 26 March 1990, which occurred after a confrontation 
between security forces and demonstrators, whom it argued, were involved in an 
illegal political rally in Bamenda. Drawing from the above, we realized that judg-
ments from the ACHPR and the UN Human Rights Committee indicate that 
the duty resting on the national (Cameroon) authorities may go further than a 
duty to merely tolerate peaceful assembly and the exercise of the right to freedom 
of expression-in fact a positive obligation may exist as the cases above elucidate.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper, I have argued that regardless of whether peaceful protests against 
government policy of assimilation are legal or not, it is a subject of public interest 
and one that is hotly debated in society (Cameroon), and this observation alone 
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obliges governments to exercise restraint in interfering with it. The case law dis-
cussed above demonstrates that the fundamental rights to freedom of expression 
and the right to assembly, including the right to take part in non-violent direct 
action, are well recognized in international law. Restrictions may apply, in the in-
terest of public order, safety etc. but these should be prescribed by law and neces-
sary in a democratic society, be proportionate to the legitimate aim being pur-
sued and should consider the significant role of freedom of expression and 
peaceful protests in a democratic society.  
It is the responsibility of each government to respect the right to freedom of ex-
pression and the right to peaceful assembly or protest, and to justify any restric-
tion to it. Government statements which falsely equate the lawful exercise of 
these rights with “acts of terrorism, hostility against the country, secession, revo-
lution, propagation of false news, collective rebellion, group rebellion, collective 
resistance” should be condemned.  
Acts of terrorism, hostility against the country, secession, revolution, propagation 
of false news, collective rebellion, group rebellion and collective resistance are the 
most serious allegations that can be levelled against anglophone activists, com-
mon law lawyers and teachers trade unions, opposition political parties militants 
and other alternative voices protesting peacefully against government policies. 
Not only do such false allegations constitute a violation of article 17 of the 
ICCPR, which guarantees the right to remain free of any unlawful attack by the 
government to one’s honour and reputation, they also undermine the activities 
of the person or organization concerned, endangering the further exercise of 
freedom of expression and the right to peaceful protest. It thus has a dangerous 
chilling effect. 
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